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The impact of venture capital investment duration on the survival of French IPOs 
Sophie Pommet1 
 
 
 
Abstract: Using a sample of 212 IPOs, this paper analyzes the impact of venture capital 
involvement on the survival time of French IPOs. We find that the ability of venture 
capitalists to improve the survival of companies is related to the duration of their investment. 
We show that venture capitalists do not create additional value if investment duration is too 
short while longer duration allows venture capitalists to monitor the firm efficiently. Our 
paper provides some interesting results that qualify the findings from empirical studies that 
highlight the absence of a positive effect of this financing on firm performance in France. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Venture capital (VC) firms are financial intermediaries that provide funding to young 
innovative companies. Several studies of VC agree that a key function of VC firms is to 
contribute funding but also to provide expertise and value-added services to their portfolio 
innovative companies. According to Gompers and Lerner (2004), venture capitalists provide 
pre-investment screening, post-investment monitoring, and value-added. When performed 
well, these roles of selection, monitoring and value-adding should lead to improved 
performance by portfolio companies (Manigart et al., 2002).  
Alongside their traditional roles, VC firms also contribute to the process of going public. 
Previous researches based on US data show that VC firms’ experience helps companies 
choose the most favorable time for their Initial Public Offerings (IPO) (Lerner, 1994a) and 
leads to their experiencing lower levels underpricing, providing support for the contribution of 
certification role of venture capitalists in IPOs (Megginson and Weiss, 1991). On the other 
hand, Lee and Wahal (2004) for the US during the period 1980-2000, and Chahine et al. 
(2007) in the French context, find that VC firms are not effective for certifying IPOs. The 
results for France indicate that French VC firms appear to engage in “grandstanding”. 
However, Goergen et al. (2009) also in a study of the French firms, show that the level of 
underpricing depends on the length of lock-up. They suggest that if the French venture 
capitalists are locked in beyond minimum requirements, then underpricing is lower. Similarly, 
Chahine and Filatotchev (2008) find that French IPOs where VC firms are affiliated to lead 
underwriters, show lower levels of underpricing than other IPO firms. 
Another strand of work analyzes the impact of VC financing on the financial and economic 
performance of IPO firms. Indeed, Barry et al. (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Jain 
and Kini (2000) indicate that venture capitalists continue to be involved in issuing firms' 
projects even after an IPO. Jain and Kini (1995) argue that VC backing can provide effective 
monitoring following an IPO but according to Bruton et al. (2010), this post-IPO monitoring 
has a cost which can limit venture capitalists’ efforts to redeploy their assets to new 
investments. Then the impact of VC firms on IPO performance can be negative rather than 
positive. The findings for the US indicate that VC-backed IPOs outperform non-VC-backed 
issues in terms of operating, financial, and long-run performance (see among others, Jain and 
Kini, 1995; Brav and Gompers, 1997; Jain and Kini, 2000; Megginson and Weiss, 1991). 
However, there may be important differences in the maturity of VC markets so that findings 
from the US context may not be generalizable to European countries. Indeed, the results of 
studies of European IPOs are less conclusive and show that VC-backed IPOs generally do not 
outperform non-VC-backed issues for operating or financial performance (Bottazzi and Da 
Rin, 2002; Rindermann, 2003). So, what do we know about the performance of the French 
VC industry, which is one of the most dynamic in Europe? Prior research on French VC-
backed IPOs most focus on financial performance and underpricing (see among others: 
Chahine et al., 2007; Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008; Goergen et al., 2009; Sentis, 2009). 
Concerning the impact of VC firms on the economic performance of French VC-backed IPOs, 
the results of Bruton et al. (2010) show that venture capitalist involvement has a negative 
effect on the firm’s economic performance measured by the adjusted return on assets (ROA) 
at the end of the year of the IPO. According to these authors, this negative outcome is the 
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result of less efficient post-IPO monitoring in France compared to other countries such as the 
UK or the USA. However, we believe that a refined assessment that takes account of the 
heterogeneity of VC financing is required for a better understanding of its effect on firm 
performance. Indeed, even among VC firms there is likely to be wide variation in the quality 
and effectiveness of their monitoring and value added services. Also, considering the variety 
of their expertise, there is no reason to consider VC firms as a homogeneous group of 
investors (Jain and Kini, 1995; Dimov and De Clercq, 2006; Bottazzi et al., 2008). So the 
question becomes not do VC firms add value to French IPOs but rather, when do VC firms 
add value to French IPOs?  
In this study, we focus on the effects of venture capitalists’ participation in IPOs in France 
and examine the impact of VC involvement on the long-run economic performance of French 
IPO firms. Thus, our focus is on the impact of VC involvement on another critical aspect of 
the going public process, namely, the survival of IPO firms subsequent to their going public 
(Jain and Kini, 2000; Audretsch and Lehmann, 2004). In line with prior VC research by Wang 
et al. (2003), this paper argues that the ability of VC to add value to portfolio companies 
depends, among other elements, on the investment duration. In focusing on VC investment 
duration, this paper suggests that VC firms cannot be treated as a homogeneous group of 
investors. This may provide new insights into our understanding of IPO performances in 
France.  
We analyze the impact of VC involvement on the survival of French IPO firms. Our analysis 
is based on hand-collected data. Our data set includes 215 French companies that went public 
between 1996 and 2006. This sample allows comparison of the survival times of VC-backed 
and non-VC-backed IPOs. Empirical investigations indicate that VC firms do not create 
additional value when investment is in the later stage of development or equivalently when 
the duration of the investment is too short (less than at least 2 years) while longer investment 
duration allows venture capitalists to monitor the firm efficiently and to add some value.  
This paper provides novel insights into previous work on venture capitalists and IPOs in 
France. It contributes first to the recent literature on VC-backed IPOs performance, by 
analyzing the dimension of long-run performance. The question of whether or how venture 
capitalist involvement improves survival times of IPO issuers has not been explored for 
France. Our research seeks to redress. It sheds light also on the potential long-run 
performance differentials between VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs. The second 
contribution is that this paper analyzes VC investment characteristics rather than considering 
VC financing as a single type of financing. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the conceptual 
framework. Section 3 presents the data sources, the variable definitions and the research 
methodology. Section 4 discusses the main results and Section 5 provides some additional 
results and robustness tests. Conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
 
2. BACKGROUNG, LITERATURE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
The literature on VC shows that there are positive (Sahlman, 1990) and negative (Amit et al., 
1990) aspects to financing by venture capitalists. Therefore, the presence of VC does not 
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necessarily have a positive impact on firm performance. By focusing on the IPO process, the 
literature identifies three main models for the role of VC firms.  
 
First, the certification model suggests that venture capitalists could certify IPO firm issuings 
(Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini, 1995). It is well known that 
third-party specialists, such as investment bankers and auditors, can help to resolve the 
asymmetric information inherent in the IPO process (Carter and Manaster, 1990). Megginson 
and Weiss (1991) explain that this role of certification can also be performed by VC firms. 
First, venture capitalists are able to reduce asymmetric information due to their direct access 
to information. Indeed, these insiders often enjoy closer relationships than other financial 
intermediaries with the managers of the firm (Sapienza et al., 1996). For instance, VC firms 
can engage in face-to-face interactions with managers, sit on the boards of VC-backed 
companies (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Fried et al., 1998), be involved in recruitment of top 
managers and in strategy development (Hellman and Puri, 2002). Second, venture capitalists 
are also large shareholders in the issuing firm, and the retention by VC firms of their holdings 
after the IPO can act as a bonding mechanism for credible certification (Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991). This is particularly true in France where lock-up agreements prevent VC firms 
from selling their shares at the time of the IPO (Goergen et al., 2009). Third, VC firms have 
very strong incentives to establish a reputation for trustworthiness in order to assure a 
continuing flow of deals, and to establish enduring relationships with their fund providers 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991). So, this reputation requirement should control possible false 
reputation.  
This model is empirically supported by several studies on the US. For instance, Megginson 
and Weiss (1991) compare a matched sample of 320 VC-backed IPOs and 320 non-VC-
backed IPOs in the period January 1983 to September 1987. They find that VC-backed firms 
enjoy lower initial returns than their counterparts, and are able to attract higher quality 
underwriters and auditors than non-VC backed firms. Megginson and Weiss (1991) argue that 
their results are consistent with the idea that VC firms certify the true value of the IPO, and 
therefore reduce underpricing. More recent studies of European countries indicate that these 
findings from the US context may not be generalizable to all of Europe. Using a sample of 
303 and 141 entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France over the period 1996-2002, Chahine 
et al. (2007) show that VCs are not effective for certifying IPOs in France. However, they 
found also that UK VC firms are effective third-party certifying agents who reduce 
underpricing in UK IPOs. For German IPOs, Goergen et al., 2009 show that the average level 
of underpricing for VC-backed firms is higher than for firms without venture capitalist 
participation. Their study is based on a sample of 265 German IPO firms that went public 
between 1996-2000. 
 
Second, the grandstanding model originally proposed by Gompers (1996), signals that VC 
firms can have incentives to grandstand, or equivalently, to take actions that signal their 
ability to potential investors. In that case, if the aim is to increase the venture capitalist’s 
reputation with the subsequent objective of raising new funds, venture capitalist may take the 
portfolio company public too early (after a short financing period). Indeed, most VC 
organizations raise money in limited partnerships which have finite lifetimes (typically 10 
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years), so that a VC firm periodically must raise a new fund/a new limited partnership. This 
puts pressure on young venture capitalists to accumulate good track records to establish 
reputation and raise new funds within a short time (Gompers, 1996). Consistent with this 
argument, Gompers (1996) finds that the less longer-established (younger) VC firms need to 
signal their quality by taking portfolio companies public earlier than would older VC firms. 
Gompers (1996) and Lee and Wahal (2004) validate this grandstanding model for the US. 
They show that IPOs backed by less experienced and younger VC firms are more prone to 
underpricing. The findings in Wang et al. (2003) for Singapore are similar. For the French 
case, Chahine et al. (2007) conclude that VC firms appear to engage in grandstanding whereas 
this is not true for UK venture capitalists. That may explain why, in France, VC-backed IPOs 
do not overtake non-VC-backed issues for operating and financial performance. However, 
Chahine and Filatotchev (2008) and Goergen et al. (2009) show that certain types of VC firms 
may be under less pressure to grandstand in order to raise further funds. For instance, Chahine 
and Filatotchev (2008) find that IPOs backed by venture capitalists affiliated to more 
prestigious underwriters show lower underpricing, suggesting that these VC firms are also 
less likely to engage in grandstanding. They show also that these affiliated VC firms play a 
more critical monitoring role than non-affiliated VC firms. Generally, it is difficult to select 
between these conflicting theoretical models: certifying and grandstanding. Hence, the effects 
of venture capitalist involvement on underpricing remain an empirical issue in Continental 
European countries and also in the US and the UK. 
 
Third, alongside their certifying role, venture capitalists are responsible for monitoring the 
companies they finance. Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) show that VC firms are better able than 
other financial intermediaries to resolve agency problems. Venture capitalists use control 
mechanisms to manage business risk and reduce agency conflicts inherent in the financing of 
innovative firms (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 2004). Among these mechanisms, 
Lerner (1994) and Gompers (1995) identify the strategies of syndication, use of specific 
control rights such as convertible securities, and the staging of capital infusions that allows 
projects to be abandoned at predefined stages (Sahlman, 1990). Besides the monitoring effect, 
VC firms are also considered to be experts able to add value to their portfolio companies. For 
instance, the involvement of VC firms can add value through close relationships with the 
managers of portfolio companies (Sapienza et al., 1996).  
This model was first supported empirically by Barry et al. (1990) for the US context. They 
focus on the monitoring role of VC firms in IPOs between 1978 and 1987 and find that 
venture capitalists provide intensive monitoring services that « […] appear to be recognized 
by capital markets through lower underpricing for IPOs with better monitors » (Barry et al., 
1990, p. 447). According to their results, the number of venture capitalists involved, the 
ownership and the length of board service of VC firms lowers IPO underpricing. Turning to 
the effect of VC monitoring on firm’s economic performance, the findings vary. First, 
focusing on a sample of IPO firms that went public on the US market during the period 1976-
1988, Jain and Kini (1995) show that VC-backed IPO firms exhibit relatively superior post-
issue operating performance (measured by ROA and operating cash flows on total assets) 
compared to non-VC-backed IPO firms. However, they also find that both VC-backed and 
non-VC-backed issuers show declining performance relative to their pre-IPO levels. Like 
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Barry et al. (1990), Jain and Kini (1995) test the impact of monitoring quality on post-IPO 
economic performance. They show that it is the number of VC firms with equity position in 
the pre-IPO firm that best explains the positive impact of VC monitoring on the post-issue 
operating performance. In the Singapore context, using a data set of firms listed on the 
Singapore stock exchange in 1987 to 2001, Wang et al. (2003) contradict the results in Jain 
and Kini (1995). Wang et al. (2003) show that VC-backed IPOs exhibit relatively inferior 
post-IPO operational performance (measured by ROA and returns on sales) compared to non-
VC-backed IPO firms. In order to mitigate their results and to understand why VC firms do 
not add value, Wang et al. (2003) classify VC-backed firms according to VC duration (long 
and short investment duration). The results obtained suggest that venture capitalists in 
Singapore with (only) long investment duration are similar to venture capitalists in the US and 
might be able to add value to the companies through monitoring. In the European context, 
focusing on a sample of 303 UK, French and German IPOs, Rindermann (2003) shows that 
VC firms, taken as a homogeneous group, do not add value to IPOs but that international 
venture capitalists (only) appear to have positive value added effects on both the operating 
and market performance of IPO firms. For a sample of French IPOs, Bruton et al. (2010) 
confirm these results showing that venture capitalists’ involvement has a negative effect on 
the firm’s operational performance at the end of the IPO year. All these findings indicate that 
the heterogeneity of VC firms needs to be considered in order to achieve a better 
understanding of the venture capitalist value adding process. 
 
The recent debate in France focuses more on the potential effects of VC firms on underpricing 
than on the economic performance of the companies that are financed. Several studies test the 
certification and grandstanding hypotheses but only a few empirical works are interested in 
analyzing the impact of VC firms’ involvement in the long-run economic performance of 
companies, or on firms’ survival. Our aim in the present paper is to respond to the following 
research questions: When do VC firms add value to French IPO firms? And equivalently, 
when does the monitoring role of VC firms really become effective for improving firm 
survival? We focus here on the impact of VC firms on the survival of IPO companies in 
France. We argue that the involvement of venture capitalists needs to be considered through a 
more refined examination of venture capitalists’ investments rather than considering VC 
financing as homogeneous financing which is only marginally informative. Indeed, even 
among VC firms there is likely to be wide variation in the quality and effectiveness of the 
monitoring and value added services they provide. Following Wang et al. (2003), we classify 
VC-backed firms according to VC investment duration proxied by stage of development. 
However, VC investment duration is expected to have opposing effects on firms’ economic 
performance.  
We present these potential effects by analyzing three type of VC investment duration 
corresponding de facto to three types of development stages: the shortest, which corresponds 
to later stage or bridge stage investment; the longest, which corresponds to early stage 
investment; and the intermediate, which corresponds to expansion stage investment. Rather 
than the classification chose by Wang et al. (2003), VC-backed IPOs are categorized 
according to two VC durations (long and short); we chose to match VC investment duration 
7 
 
with stage of development financed. This classification allows us to analyze more precisely 
the potential opposing effects for each development stage/VC duration. 
 
First, like Wang et al. (2003), we argue that the longer the VC participation, the greater the 
venture capitalist’s ability to monitor and add value to the IPO company. For Jain and Kini 
(1995), the length of VC participation is a proxy for the quality of venture capitalist’s 
monitoring. Therefore, the monitoring effect of venture capitalists will be stronger for longer 
VC investment duration. Cumming and Johan (2010) also explain that the certification role of 
VC firms should be more effective if VC firms have been involved in the company for many 
years. According to Cumming and MacIntosh (2001, p. 450), « […] the longer the duration, 
the greater the value of the certification effect ». We can argue that longer VC participation 
will lead to a more positive impact on the company’s economic performance or equivalently 
on its survival.  
However, it is well known that early stage VC investments face greater information 
asymmetry. In that case, a negative effect of VC financing might be due to adverse selection. 
VC firms may be denied the opportunity to invest in the most promising companies. In a 
theoretical article, Amit et al. (1990) argue that US VC funds provided very low rates of 
return in the 1980s (the mean internal rate of return was less than 10% at the end of 1985) 
because there were opportunities only to fund less skilled entrepreneurs and less profitable 
ventures. As a result of the adverse selection problem associated with asymmetric 
information, only less able entrepreneurs (i.e. less profitable ventures) will choose to involve 
VC firms in their capital structures. Manigart et al. (2002), on the other hand, argue that the 
high rates of return imposed by venture capitalists make this source of finance very costly, 
and that the best projects will seek funding from other, less costly sources. As a consequence, 
only second best projects apply for VC funding. We can reasonably expect that early stage 
investments are more strongly influenced by adverse selection than later stage investments. It 
is difficult to select between these theoretical arguments, thus we propose that: 
 
H1a: compared to non-VC-backed IPO, VC-backed IPO financed by long VC investment 
duration will show superior economic performance. 
  
H1b: compared to non-VC-backed IPO, VC-backed IPO financed by long VC investment 
duration will show inferior economic performance. 
 
Turning to the effect of short investment duration, we can also identify opposing effects. First, 
we can argue that the shorter the VC participation, the less the VC ability to monitor and add 
value to the IPO company. Exerting effort is costly; therefore, a VC firm that wants to create 
larger added value through its management support needs a long-term relationship with its 
portfolio company (Tykvová, 2006). Short investment duration, then, may reveal the VC 
firm’s decision to take advantage of the market and invest before rapidly exiting (Cumming 
and Johan, 2010). « If - in an extreme case - a private equity investor offers only money and 
no management support, it may invest in the firm to park its money and resell the firm very 
fast » (Tykvová, 2006, p. 403). In that case, VC firms engage in grandstanding. If VC firms 
do not offer monitoring services and other value enhancing activities but create other conflicts 
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or engage in grandstanding, the performance of short term VC-backed firms will be worse 
than that of non-VC-backed firms.  
However, investing in later stage development should offset the negative effect due to adverse 
selection. Indeed, later stage investments face less information asymmetry than early stage 
investments because firms have already developed and begun to market their products in this 
stage of development. Furthermore, in France, VC firms are usually specialized in later-stage 
development. According to De Clercq et al. (2001), a specialist expertise allows for a better 
understanding of the complexities associated with a particular development stage. The 
accumulation of knowledge over a specific development stage can be used to manage similar 
investments more effectively. Thus, one can expect relatively higher certification effects of 
VC investment in later stage development in France, or at least a sharp decrease in adverse 
selection. In that case, we would expect that the performance of short VC-backed IPOs to be 
better than that of non-VC-backed IPOs. As before, we suggest two opposing hypotheses: 
 
H2a: compared to non-VC-backed IPO, VC-backed IPO financed by short VC investment 
duration will show inferior economic performance.  
 
H2b: compared to non-VC-backed IPO, VC-backed IPO financed by short VC investment 
duration will show superior economic performance.  
 
Turning to the effect of intermediate investment duration (between shortest and longest VC 
investment duration), it is more difficult to produce the opposing effects and to select between 
these conflicting theoretical arguments. First, the monitoring effect of venture capitalists will 
be stronger for this VC investment duration than for the shortest VC investment duration but 
less strong than for the longest one. Second, VC investments in the expansion stage face less 
information asymmetry than VC investments in the early development stage. Thus, we can 
reasonably expect that early stage investments are influenced more severely by adverse 
selection than expansion stage investments. Third, the danger of grandstanding should be less 
for intermediate VC duration than for the shortest duration. Therefore, we suggest that the 
performance of intermediate VC-backed IPOs will be better than that of non-VC-backed 
IPOs. Hence, we propose: 
 
H3: compared to non-VC-backed IPO, VC-backed IPO financed by intermediate VC 
investment duration will show superior economic performance. 
 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
Our sample includes French IPOs that were floated on the main and secondary tier markets 
over the period 1996-20062. Our primary list of IPOs was obtained from the Euronext files. 
These files contain information such as first-day closing price, money raised at the IPO, issue 
                                                          
2
 We excluded firms issued on the Premier Marché in order to avoid too large dispersion in the sample. These firms are 
among the largest, and have higher market capitalization than firms in other markets due to higher listing and disclosure 
requirements than in other markets.   
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proceeds, etc. Additional data are from  Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) publications 
which contain company listing prospectuses and annual reports. We use these prospectuses 
and annual reports to derive quantitative information on several financial and business 
variables. We also collected data for post-IPO years from companies' annual reports; where 
annual reports were not available, we obtained data from the DIANE (Van Dijk) database. 
Similar to the methodologies used by Chahine et al. (2007) and Coakley et al. (2007), from 
the original list of more than 600 IPOs in the period 1996–2006 we excluded: investment 
trusts, financial companies, building societies, transfers from other stock markets or market 
tiers, foreign-incorporated companies, registrations at the time of a relisting following 
temporary suspension of a firm. We also excluded all IPOs that represented de-mergers or 
equity reorganizations. As a result of this selection, the final sample includes 215 
entrepreneurial IPOs in France for which we have all the information required for the study. 
 
We use a survival analysis methodology to analyze the impact of involvement of VC in firm's 
survival. Survival analysis has been applied to business to analyze the economic performance 
of new-technology based firms (Storey and Tether, 1998). The advantage of survival analysis 
is that it overcomes the problem of inadvertent survivorship bias. Survival analysis allows us 
to account for the most promising and the least promising firms, with very high or very low 
economic performance. Unlike logit or probit models, survival analysis allows us to assess the 
conditional probability of failure given that the company has survived so far. Thus, survival 
analysis can cope with right censored data which represents situations where a failure event 
has not yet occurred, and with time-series data with different time horizons (Jenkins, 2005). 
The IPO market we study is characterized by both situations (Jain and Kini, 2000). The data 
are right censored, since at any point in time a proportion of the companies that went public 
are still listed. Further, the time window is different for each firm depending on when in the 
sample period it went public: in our sample, firms went public between 1996 and 2006. 
Finally, survival analysis allows us to apply a competing risk model to account for 
heterogeneity in firm exit. While the literature identifies survival as indicative of positive 
performance, and firm exit as representing negative performance (Caves, 1998), the mode of 
exit also needs to be considered. We consider here that different from an event of liquidation, 
involvement in a merger or acquisition might well be positive. 
IPOs are tracked up to December 2012 to determine whether or not they were delisted. The 
date of delisting and mode of exit were collected from official reports available on the NYSE 
Euronext website and the economic newspaper Les Echos. In line with Jain and Kini (2000) 
and Espenlaub et al. (2012), we define survivors as firms that continue to operate 
independently as public corporations. Thus, firms delisted from the markets due to failure or 
an acquisition or merger are classified as non-survivors. We excluded three firms delisted due 
to voluntary delisting, leaving a sample of 212 IPOs. In this paper, we relax the assumption of 
homogeneous exit by accounting for mode of exit, namely firm liquidation or firm 
acquisition/merger. According to Schary (1991), there are important economic differences 
between the forms of exit, and when studying firm survival, we need to consider and separate 
exit types. Following Manigart et al. (2002) and Cockburn and Wagner (2010), we consider 
that involvement in a merger or acquisition may be positive. 
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We focus on firm survival time through a duration variable3. Let T be the number of years that 
our companies have survived up to 2012. A basic concept for the analysis of survival times is 
the hazard function h(t) which is defined as the limit. It is the conditional failure rate defined 
as the probability of exit during a very short time interval assuming the firm has survived to 
the beginning of that interval. The hazard function is defined as the probability density 
function and the cumulative distribution function. The hazard function is given by: 
  ሺ ሻ   ሺ ሻ ሺ ሻ            ሺ            ሻ   
 
where Δt is a very short time interval. This conditional probability is the probability that exit 
occurs in the time interval [t ; t + Δt], based on no exit before the beginning of time t. 
 
Like Hensler et al. (1997), Jain and Kini (2000), and Espenlaub et al. (2012), we estimate a 
survival model known as the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model. The advantage of the 
AFT model is that it allows the impact of the independent variables on survival time to vary 
over the post-IPO period depending on the length of time since listing (Jain and Kini, 2000; 
Espenlaud et al., 2012). For instance, Jain and Kini (2000, p. 1156), explain that «[…] it is 
quite reasonable to expect that the impact of VC involvement on survival may be greater for 
IPO firms that have recently gone public compared to those that have a longer history as a 
public company». The AFT model is parametric making it necessary to specify the 
distribution of the baseline survival function (Jenkins, 2005). In line with Cleves et al. (2004), 
we use likelihood or Wald tests and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) test to select a 
respectively nested and non-nested parametric model4. The AIC test shows that for our model, 
the log-normal distribution has a lower AIC value than other distributions, and hence we 
select the log-normal distribution. 
 
Survival methods can be extended to the analysis of situations where there are different exit 
routes, namely, bankruptcy or voluntary liquidation, and merger/acquisition. We then relax 
the assumption of homogeneous exit by accounting for mode of exit in order to examine 
whether the determinants of exit differ depending on the exit route. We compute a competing 
risk model (CMR) which is an extension of a standard duration model with the possibility of 
exit to one of several destination states (Jenkins, 2005). This model requires only that 
competing risks are mutually exclusive and exhaustive (i.e., a firm cannot exit through 
simultaneous liquidation and acquisition/merger) (Estève-Perez et al., 2010). We therefore 
report estimation results for both a pooled model that does not distinguish between different 
modes of exit, and a competing risks model that takes explicit account of the different exit 
routes. 
 
                                                          
3
 These explanations are based on Jenkins (2005). 
4
 For more information, see Cleves et al. (2004) or Jenkins (2005). 
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As a robustness check, and to enable comparison with other studies, in addition to the AFT 
model we estimate the Cox proportional hazard (PH) model5. We estimate the Cox PH model 
(a semi-parametric model) for both the pooled model which does not distinguish between 
different modes of exit, and for the competing risk model6. The Cox PH model makes no 
assumptions about failure distribution (Jenkins, 2005). However, the interpretation of the 
results is quite different for the AFT model and the well-known Cox proportional hazard 
model (PH model). The AFT regression coefficient relates proportionate changes in survival 
time to a unit change in a given regressor, all other characteristics being held fixed. 
Interpretation of the coefficients of the PH model is different: they relate a one unit change in 
a regressor to a proportionate change in the hazard rate not the survival time (Jenkins, 2005). 
The Cox PH model requires the hazard of the independent variables to be proportional, such 
that changes in the level of an independent variable are assumed to produce proportionate 
changes in the hazard function, independent of time (Jenkins, 2005). We tested the 
proportionality assumption specifications based on Schoenfeld residuals of the Cox 
regressions (Cleves et al., 2004); the results show that this model is not particularly well 
suited to our data. 
 
According to Cleves et al. (2004) and Jenkins (2005), AFT models typically follow the 
parameterization: 
   (  )           
 
Specifically, we estimate the following model:  
   (  )                                                           ሺ    ሻ                                                                                           ሺ      ሻ                                 
 
where   (  ) is time to failure, which is measured (in years) as the time interval from IPO date 
to delisting date. Survival time is the period between 1996 (year of first listing in the sample) 
and the year that the company exited as a result of liquidation or merger/acquisition. Survival 
time is right censored to 2012 since for continuing firms we do not have a recorded exit event. 
The independent variables are defined as follows.  
Age is calculated as the difference (in years) between the founding date of the company and 
the date of its IPO. Bearing in mind evidence that the link between age and survival may 
follow an inverted U-pattern (Evans, 1987), we also enter in the model the squared term of 
age: Age2 (Evans, 1987; Cefis and Marsili, 2005). 
                                                          
5
 We also tested the model with other distribution of the baseline survival function as a robustness check. 
6
 A formal test of whether exits to different states are behaviorally distinct is presented in Appendix B. 
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Ln(size) is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the IPO firm at the IPO price 
(expressed in euros). Similar to Coakley et al. (2007), this variable controls for size.  
Similar to Audretsch and Lehmann (2004), Growth Rate is the difference in the number of the 
firm's employees at the time of IPO, and one year after the IPO (measured as the difference in 
the natural logarithm). 
Investment Bank Reputation is a dummy variable used to control for lead underwriter 
reputation. Indeed, Carter et al. (1998) show that IPOs managed by more reputable 
underwriters are associated with less short-run underpricing, and Jain and Kini (2000) argue 
that reputable investment banks enhance IPOs survival. Following the methodology in Broye 
and Schatt (2003) for the French case, we distinguish two groups of investment banks - 
reputable investment banks and non-reputable investment banks - according to the number of 
participations in IPOs during the period of analysis (1996-2006), in each year. We consider 
that an investment bank is reputable if it has participated in a number of IPOs above the 
median value. The variable Investment Bank Reputation is a dummy that takes the value 1 if 
the IPO is backed by a reputable lead investment bank and 0 otherwise. 
The financial literature shows that the ownership structure can have an influence on corporate 
performance. This influence is not necessarily positive. For instance, McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) show that the relation between ownership structure and performance should be 
considered non-linear, confirmed by Séverin (2001) for the French case. However, according 
to Jain and Kini (1994) managerial ownership retention has a positive impact on post-IPO 
performance and enhances IPO survival (Jain and Kini, 2000). A similar result was obtained 
by Hensler et al. (1997) which considers the impact of the percentage of shares held by 
insiders on firm survival. Similar to Hensler et al. (1997), Séverin (2001), and Espenlaub et al. 
(2012), we define the variable Insider Ownership as ownership (percentages) by members of 
Board of Directors (BOD) at the time of IPO7.  
We include two independent variables Ln(patent) and Intangibles Ratio to account for some 
of the firm's intangible assets. Based on the types of companies listed on the financial market 
during the period 1996-2006, and the number of firms (70% of our sample) listed on 
“Nouveau Marché" and Alternext, the potential for innovation of these companies would 
seem important. Indeed, Baum and Silverman (2004) and Villalonga (2004) highlight the 
strategic role of innovation in business survival. The variable Ln(patent) is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the number of patents owned by the company at the time of IPO8. Due to 
the limited availability of accounting data and especially R&D expenses, we calculate the 
ratio of intangible assets to total assets to account for the nature of the assets (Hasan and 
Wang, 2008) and the proportion of intangible assets owned by the company (Villalonga, 
2004)9. The variable Intangibles Ratio is the capitalized amount of intangible assets divided 
by total assets10. 
                                                          
7
 Following the methodology in Khurshed et al. (2005), this measure of ownership includes ownership by BOD members via 
corporate vehicles. 
8
 This variable should be interpreted with caution because some of the companies in our sample were not able to protect their 
innovations by patents at the time of IPO. In contrast to the US system, the EU and especially the French legal system do not 
allow firms (easily) to obtain patents on software. 
9
 Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) collected data on R&D expenditure for a set of 5 new European markets. They explain that their 
sample of firms was reduced almost 50% due to lack of data on R&D expenditure. 
10
 It should be noted that the correlation matrix does not show a significant correlation between Ln(patent) and Intangibles 
Ratio.  
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Our main interest in this study is the impact of VC involvement on firm survival. Similar to 
Jain and Kini (2000), we define the independent variable Venture Capital as a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the IPO firm was VC backed before the date of the IPO and 
zero otherwise. We identified VC firms from various sources: European Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA), Association Française des Investisseurs pour la Croissance (AFIC - the 
French equivalent of EVCA), venture capitalists’ websites, and Les Echos.  
In a second step, we use four more proxies for VC involvement and monitoring to test our 
hypotheses. The variable VC Number is derived from Lerner (1994), Jain and Kini (1995), 
and Dimov and De Clercq (2006). VC Number is defined as the number of venture capitalists 
holding equity stakes at the time of the IPO11. This variable takes account of the quality of VC 
monitoring. We include three more dummy variables to account for length of the venture 
capitalist’s investment period. As already explained, the duration of venture capitalist 
investment is proxied by the development stage of the company. A VC firm investing in the 
first development stage (seed/start-up stage) will participate for longer than a venture 
capitalist investing in a later development stage (e.g. bridge stage). Similar to the 
classification in Tykvová (2006), the variable VCEarly is a dummy that equals 1 if the 
company received its first equity financing during the two years previous to the company’s 
establishment (start-up/seed financing). The variable VCBridge takes the value 1 if the firm 
received its first equity financing during the 12 months prior to the IPO (bridge financing). 
The variable VCExpansion (expansion stage) is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm received its 
first equity financing neither in the start-up/seed stage nor in the bridge stage. VC firms that 
invest in the early stage, retain their equity shares for around five years. Investment in the 
expansion stage means they retain their equity share for around four while bridge stage 
investment involves only one year of equity share on average. The respective median values 
are 4 years, 3 years and 1 year12. Further tests using a Cox PH model (not presented here but 
available on request), confirmed that VC firms participate for longer duration if they invest in 
the early stage compared to bridge or expansion stage. 
Finally, in order to control for differences in technology sectors, and their influence on the 
survival rates of firms, we include aggregated industry dummy variables for six industry 
sectors, based on the Euronext classification and the APE codes (French company sectoral 
classification codes). We defined six dummy variables for the following sectors: ITS 
(comprising Internet, IT services, E-commerce and software), Life Sciences (comprising 
biomedical and pharmaceutical sectors), Media (Media & Entertainment), Telecom, NHT 
(Non High Tech products and service), and Other (other high-technology and electronics 
products and services). 
The findings in Coakley et al. (2007) show that post-issue operating performance of IPOs 
concentrated in the 1998–2000 bubble years, declines sharply, while IPOs perform normally 
in the remaining years. They indicate that poor quality IPOs were taken public during the 
bubble period. This period could lead to some overestimation of the lower survival of IPO 
firms in our sample. To control for time effects, we include IPO date as a dummy variable for 
                                                          
11
 The number of venture capitalists is strongly correlated with the aggregate equity stake of venture capitalists. 
12
 For a comparison of VC investment durations when firms are financed by venture capitalists in the early, expansion and 
bridge stage, see Appendix A, Table 8.  
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the years 1998, 1999, and 2000. These three dummies allow us to take account of the hot 
market issue period and its possible impact on firm survival.  
 
 
4. RESULTS 
(i) Descriptive statistics and survival times 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the whole sample and for the samples of VC and 
non-VC-backed IPOs. The average firm age and size of IPO firms in our main sample are 
10.29 years and 68.31 million euros, respectively. VC-backed firms are relatively larger than 
non-VC-backed firms (41.42 and 87.03 million euros respectively). Perhaps the most 
surprising result is for the variable Investment Bank Reputation. It seems that venture 
capitalists in France are unable to attract the most prestigious underwriters (significant 
difference at the 0.1% level). The results obtained by Rindermann (2003) for the period 1996-
1999 confirm this: venture capitalists in France do not play a role in certification for IPO. IPO 
firms show relatively high levels of insider ownership, with mean ownership at around 75%; 
non-VC-backed firms show significantly (at the 0.1% level) higher levels of insider 
ownership than VC-backed companies (86.65% and 66.65% respectively). This may reflect 
the fact that insiders have to relinquish a part of their equity stake in favor of venture 
capitalists (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003) who may not be board members (in our sample, in 
around 60% of cases venture capitalists are not board members at the time of the IPO). Table 
1 shows also that for VC-backed firms the number of patents is higher than for non-VC-
backed firms although, we cannot identify the direction of the causality. VC funding may 
have an impact on the number of patented innovations (Kortum and Lerner, 2000) but patents 
might act to signal the good quality of the firm’s innovations which might attract VC 
financing. For the other control variables, we do not observe significant difference between 
years and sectors. VC-backed firms are not especially concentrated in a sector compared to 
non-VC-backed firms, and all firms are more likely to belong to the ITS sector. 
 
[Insert table 1] 
 
Table 2 compares the descriptive statistics for the subsamples of companies that continued to 
be listed until the end of our study period at December 2012 (survivors), and those companies 
that had been delisted by December 2012 due to a merger/acquisition or liquidation (non-
survivors). Table 2 shows significant differences between listed and delisted IPO firms. In 
terms of the characteristics of IPO firms, the results show that surviving companies are older, 
are larger in size, and have higher growth rates than non-survivors. 
It is interesting that delisted firms have higher insider ownership than surviving firms. This 
contrasts with the result in Jain and Kini (2000); however the different modes of firm exit 
may help to explain this result. Our intuition about number of patents held by companies is 
confirmed: surviving firms have a bigger number of patents than delisted firms.  
However, the results for our main variables related to VC financing are less conclusive: we do 
not observe significant differences between firms. In our views, this may be the result of non-
discrimination between merger/acquisition and liquidation events.  
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As noted previously, most companies in our sample were listed during the bubble period but 
non-surviving firms seem to be concentrated in year 1998 and years 1999 and 2000 show no 
significant differences. In terms of sectoral variables, we do not observe any significant 
differences.   
 
[Insert table 2] 
 
Table 3 summarizes the dependent variable of our multivariate analyses (the time between the 
firm’s IPO and its delisting) within the groups of VC and non-VC-backed firms but also 
within the groups of firms financed by venture capitalists in their early, expansion and bridge 
stage of development. Comparing the average duration of VC and non-VC-backed firms; we 
find that VC financing is associated with shorter survival times. We also find that IPOs 
financed by VC firms in the later stage of development are associated with shorter survival 
times than other IPOs. 
[Inset table 3] 
 
(ii) Multivariate survival analysis: competing risk model 
 
The results of our pooled model (which does not distinguish between exit routes) hide some 
interesting differences related to types of exit. The results of the competing risks model, 
which distinguishes between delisting due to a firm merger or acquisition, and delisting due to 
business failure, are more revealing. Table 4 column (1) presents the estimation results for the 
pooled model, while columns (2) and (3) present the results for the competing risks model 
which distinguishes between exits due to merger/acquisition and delisting due to business 
failure. In general, we consider that involvement in a merger or acquisition may well be 
positive for the firm in contrast to liquidation. However, if bankruptcy can be interpreted as 
failure, being bought might be more ambiguous: on the one hand, a firm may represent a 
valuable investment for another firm, because its business is profitable. On the other hand, a 
non-profitable firm facing bankruptcy might be bought in order to acquire its assets not 
because of its operations (Cockburn and Wagner, 2010). To try to mitigate this ambiguous 
effect, we classify firms closed due to bankruptcy and bought by other firms as being 
involved in a liquidation event13.  
As noted above, for the AFT model, we choose the log-normal distribution as the baseline 
survival function based on the AIC test. As a robustness check, we also estimate the Cox PH 
model. Note, however, that interpretation of the coefficients is different for the Cox PH and 
AFT models. While the dependent variable in the Cox model measures risk of failure, in the 
AFT model it measures survival time. We report both the coefficient and the time ratio for the 
independent variables of the AFT model in Table 4 and we report both the coefficient and 
hazard ratio for the independent variables of the Cox PH model in Table 6. In the AFT model, 
a positive coefficient implies a time ratio greater than 1, which indicates that an increase in 
                                                          
13
 Some firms are likely to be acquired as a result of financial difficulty or poor performance. However, due to the difficulty 
involved in obtaining identical performance measures for all firms prior to their delisting, we cannot classify firms using a 
similar methodology to that employed by Jain and Kini (2000) or Espenlaub et al. (2012). Instead, we use the specification in 
Fontana and Nesta (2009), Cockburn and Wagner (2010) and Esteve-Perez et al. (2010). 
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the covariate increases survival time (or equivalently, slows down failure). In the Cox PH 
model, a positive coefficient implies a hazard ratio greater than 1, which indicates that an 
increase in the covariate increases failure rate (or equivalently, decreases expected duration). 
 
[Insert table 4] 
 
Table 4 shows that Age and Size of companies have no effect on firm survival while the 
variable Age2 (squared value of age) has a negative and significant coefficient indicating that 
exits occur mainly among “middle-aged” firms. The result for the effect of Age is clearly 
different in the competing risk model. Age has a positive and significant coefficient for firms 
delisted due to business failure indicating that younger firms show lower survival times when 
considering exit due to liquidation, and no effect on time to delisting through a 
merger/acquisition. This result is consistent with the results in several empirical studies 
notably in Cockburn and Wagner (2010) and Esteve-Perez et al. (2010). Firm growth rate has 
a positive impact on firm survival time in columns (1) and (2). In column (1), a one-unit 
increase in Growth Rate increases survival time by between 51% and 52%. The estimated 
effect of firm’s Growth Rate is positive and significant for firms that merged or were acquired 
following their IPO suggesting that firms that grow faster are likely to be acquired or merged 
less immediately (survival time increases by 62%). However, this variable has no effect on 
survival time when we consider exit via liquidation.  
Insider Ownership has a negative effect on survival time. This variable has a quite small 
impact on survival time which decreases by 7% for a one unit increase of Insider Ownership. 
Ownership by board members at the time of the IPO is significant for explaining exit via 
liquidation. The negative coefficient indicates that increasing ownership by insiders speeds 
time to delisting due to business failure but only slightly (survival time decreases by 1 
percentage point). The impact of this variable is surprising but seems to support the results 
obtained by Serve (2007) for the French “Nouveau Marché”, that IPO firms with high levels 
of managerial ownership retention show faster decline in post-issue operating performance 
than firms with lower levels of managerial ownership retention. Our result is in line with the 
entrenchment hypothesis developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1989). The absence of a 
significant effect on delisting via merger/acquisition, in our view, is quite surprising: 
concentration of ownership known to be an anti-OPA mechanism, should significantly 
diminish the probability of exit via merger/acquisition but in our sample, we do not obtain this 
kind of result. 
Turning to the effect of share of intangible assets in total assets, there are very substantial 
differences in the time ratios for different modes of exit. The effect of Intangibles Ratio is not 
statistically significant in the pooled risks specification, and the competing risks specification 
shows clearly that this result is due to two offsetting effects. Intangibles Ratio has a 
significant and negative coefficient (Table 4 column (2)) indicating that firms reporting higher 
shares of intangibles assets compared to total assets are likely to be acquired or merged earlier 
(survival time decreases by 84%) while the results are the opposite for exit via liquidation 
(with an effect of smaller magnitude). Firms with large stocks of intangibles may represent a 
threat but also may represent an opportunity for other firms to acquire valuable intangible 
capital and distinctive skills. So a high stock of intangible capital may be an asset that is 
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attractive to potential acquirers of the firm (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999). The variable 
Ln(patent) has a positive coefficient, suggesting that ownership of patents confers certain 
advantages on the firm that translate into higher survival time which increases by around 30% 
for a one unit increase in Ln(patent). The results for this variable show also that firms with 
more patents are protected against merger/acquisition, while there is no significant effect for 
exit via liquidation. These results are in line mostly with those obtained by Cefis and Marsili 
(2005), Fontana et al. (2007), and Cockburn and Wagner (2010). These authors explain that 
this outcome may indicate the triggering of a merger/acquisition perhaps by business 
difficulties/distress may be significantly delayed by ownership of patents. However, these 
findings show that the merger/acquisition mechanism is complex, and that not all intangible 
assets provide the same competitive advantage or protection to firms. It should be noted also 
that a several firms in our sample belong to the Internet and software sectors, areas where 
French regulation makes it difficult for firms to obtain patents.  
Investment Bank Reputation has no effect on firm survival whatever the model considered. 
Interestingly, the outcomes show that an IPO in the years 1998 and 2000 (for column (1)) 
significantly reduces survival time. 
Turning to the effect of VC financing, very substantial differences are apparent in the time 
ratios for different modes of exit14. We are interesting in the impact of quality of VC 
monitoring on exit routes as well as VC ability to create additional value. To measure the 
impact of VC financing on firm survival, we employ several variables and models. We use 
four variables for VC involvement and monitoring, to test our hypotheses about the value 
adding process. In column (1), we find that firm survival time decreases as the number of 
venture capitalists involved in the financing increases. A one-unit increase in VC Number, 
decreases survival time by 8%. Number of VC firms, identified by Jain and Kini (1995) as a 
proxy for monitoring quality, does not show the expected result. However, in columns (2) and 
(3) we see that the negative coefficient in the pooled risks specification derives from the effect 
on exit via merger/acquisition. Firms financed by a large number of venture capitalists are 
more likely to be acquired within a short time or merged with another firm. The impact of VC 
Number is not negligible because survival time decreases by 10% with an increase of one-unit 
in the number of venture capitalists involved in the financing. This suggests that VC firms 
still involved in the company after the IPO may find attractive to sell their shares via a 
merger/acquisition because this type exit is also promising for VC firms (Giot and 
Schwienbacher, 2007). According to Jain and Kini (1995) and Wang et al. (2003) most 
venture capitalists continue to hold significant equity stakes for one or two years after the 
IPO, and the outcome obtained for this proxy for monitoring quality tends to support the 
hypothesis of value added. Moreover, in France venture capitalists are subject to a lock-up 
agreement at the time of the IPO and are forced to keep most of their equity stake for between 
                                                          
14
 Appendix C, table 9 shows the results for the AFT competing risk model when employing the binary variable Venture 
Capital in order to test the global impact of VC financing on firm survival time. In Table 9, Venture Capital has no 
significant effect (but with a p-value = 0.123) on survival time when considering the whole period of analysis. The negative 
sign on the coefficient indicates that VC-backed firms may display lower survival times than non-VC-backed firms. This 
result is consistent with that obtained by Audretsch and Lehmann (2004) for Germany, and by Espenlaub et al. (2012) for the 
UK but differs with Jain and Kini’s (2000) and Cockburn and Wagner’s (2010) results for the USA. However, this negative 
effect is due to the fact that there are some differences between the different types of exits; this dummy variable is only 
significant for exit via liquidation with a negative coefficient. 
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6 and 12 months after the IPO (Goergen et al., 2009). Also, the financial market in France is 
shallower and less liquid than the US and UK markets. So VC firms might find attractive to 
sell their shares through a merger/acquisition rather than reselling directly in the market. Lack 
of market liquidity is often highlighted as an obstacle to a more dynamic VC industry.  
We find no significant effect for the variable VCEarly suggesting that the early stage VC 
investments face greater information asymmetry and thus are more severely influenced by 
adverse selection than other VC and non-VC investments. It is possible that the negative 
effect of adverse selection outweighs the positive effect of longer duration of VC investment 
but we find no direct support for this. Thus, we cannot confirm hypotheses H1a or H1b. The 
effect of VCExpansion is not statistically significant in the pooled risks model, but the 
competing risks specification clearly shows that this result is due to two offsetting effects. 
This variable shows a significant and positive coefficient (Table 4 column (2)) indicating that 
firms financed by VC during the expansion stage (2 years after firm foundation to at least 1 
year before IPO) have longer survival times than other firms, and so are less likely to be 
acquired or merged in a short time. The time ratio for this variable is particularly high 
indicating a huge impact on firm survival time which increases by a multiple of 2.446. 
However, the opposite result is found for exit via liquidation (with a small effect i.e. 
significant at the 10% level - Table 4 column (3)) indicating that the firms financed by VC 
during this stage of development are also more likely to be liquidated very soon after the IPO. 
This result hides the different and significant effects of this type of financing on the two exit 
routes. We should bear in mind that stage of development is used here as a proxy for venture 
capitalists’ investment duration since the earlier the finance is provided to the firm, the longer 
will be the investment duration. However, the results are determined by our choice of 
variables VCEarly, VCExpansion and VCBridge. If we follow the classification employed in 
Wang et al. (2003), we obtain rather different results. If like Wang et al. (2003) we consider 
that firms with less than two years of VC support before the IPO should be categorized as 
short VC-backed IPOs, we then have to reassign to the bridge stage some firms initially 
defined as financed in the expansion stage. If we assume this reclassification (see Table 7), 
the variable VCExpansion becomes insignificant (column (3)) with a single identical effect 
shown in column (2). These results provide support for our hypothesis H3 indicating that VC 
financing is involved in the value adding process if investment is in the expansion stage. 
Turning to the effect of VCBridge, we find one main result: the negative and significant 
coefficient of this variable (column (3)) indicates that firms financed by VC during the later 
stage of development (with short duration VC investment) are more likely to suffer rapid 
liquidation (survival time decreases by 48%) than other firms. This outcome shows that VC 
firms are able to create additional value only if the investment is for a long period of time. 
Note also that in the additional specification described above, the variable VCbridge becomes 
significant in the pooled risks specification in Table 10 column (1) indicating a negative 
impact of this variable on firm survival time if exit is treat as a homogeneous event. These 
findings support our hypothesis H2a. 
 
Our findings show that VC firms do not create additional value if they invest in later stages or 
equivalently if investment duration is too short (less than a minimum of 2 years) while longer 
investment duration allows venture capitalists to monitor the firm efficiently and to add some 
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value. However, the earliest stage of investment seem to be more prone to adverse selection. 
At the same time, the proxy for quality of VC monitoring shows a positive result. Therefore, it 
seems that need to consider several criteria to achieve a better understanding of the 
contribution of venture capitalists to improved firm performance. These results show that 
analyzing VC firms as a single group of investors is not sufficient to understand the role of the 
forces at play.  
 
 
5. ADDITIONAL RESULTS: FURTHER TESTING ON PERIOD OF ANALYSIS 
AND ROBUSTNESS RESULTS 
 
(i) Period of analysis: bubble versus normal period 
 
We provide two types of additional tests concerning our results.  
Firstly, following Wang et al. (2003) and Coakley et al. (2007), we separate our sample into 
two periods: normal (1996-1997/2001-2006), and bubble (1998-2000). Indeed, Coakley et al. 
(2007) show that poor quality companies - both VC and non-VC-backed - are taken public 
during bubble periods resulting in considerably decreased operating performance. The bubble 
period can lead to overestimates of the negative impact of VC financing on firm performance. 
Thus, considering both sample periods should offer some contrasting results concerning the 
impact of VC involvement on firm survival.  
Models in Table 5 treat observations delisted due to both merger/acquisition and liquidation 
as failures, and report the results separately for the normal and bubble periods15. We first 
summarize the results for the normal years (1996-1997 and 2001-2006) for our sample using 
specifications 3 and 4. Based on the results in Coakley et al. (2007) for UK IPOs, we 
conjecture that the impact of VC financing on firm survival is not identical for the two periods 
of analysis.   
The coefficient of the Investment Bank Reputation is positive and significant at the 1% level 
which contrasts with the finding for the full sample. This suggests that during the normal 
period, by choosing a reputable underwriter, the IPO firm can increase its survival time. This 
finding is consistent with the result in Espenlaub et al. (2012) for the UK AIM market. The 
coefficient of the ratio of intangible assets is significant with a negative sign indicating that 
firm survival time decreases as the ratio of intangible assets increases. This result has been 
explained by the different modes of firm exit considered. The coefficients of the Ln(patent), 
Growth Rate, Insider Ownership and VCExpansion are unchanged. The variable Venture 
Capital has no significant effect on firm survival time while the variable VC Number has a 
negative and significant (only at the 10% level) effect on firm survival time. However, in 
model 4, the variable VCEarly now shows a positive and significant coefficient, indicating 
that duration of VC involvement/monitoring has a positive effect on firm survival time. This 
variable effect predominates in the ratio with value (2.669): being financed by venture 
capitalists in the early stage of development increases survival time by a multiple of 2.669 
                                                          
15
 It should be noted that due to the number of observations, we cannot split our sample into two sub-periods when 
considering the different modes of firm exit. 
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compared to other firms. This finding, which reinforces our previous results, is in line with 
the idea that the longer the duration of VC investment the larger the additional value created 
by venture capitalists. Also, this result mitigates the absence of a significant effect of this 
dummy variable in the pooled model in Table 4. The positive aspect linked to longer duration 
of VC investment seems to outweigh the negative effect due to adverse selection only during 
the period of normal activity. 
Interestingly, the results for the 1998-2000 bubble years show differences (models 1 and 2). 
Some variables and some models lose significance. The variable Investment Bank Reputation 
becomes insignificant. In model 1, we find that Venture Capital has a significant and negative 
coefficient indicating that VC-backed firms have shorter survival times than non-VC-backed 
firms. Receiving VC financing reduces firm survival time by 52% during the bubble period. 
These results are in line with those obtained by Coakley et al. (2007) for the UK, which do 
not support screening activities by reputable sponsors (venture capitalists and underwriters) in 
the bubble period. At the same time, our results for this time period support the idea of a 
conjunction between the phenomena of adverse selection and grandstanding. According to 
Wang et al. (2003), the grandstanding effect may magnify the effect of adverse selection since 
premature IPO would expose the listed company to a higher business risk and in our case 
result in shorter survival time. Finally, the impact of VC involvement on firm survival time 
seems to be mitigated depending on the period of analysis and the duration of investment 
(stage of development) considered. The inclusion of the bubble period seems to neutralize the 
positive impact of receiving very long duration investment from venture capitalists (proxied 
by VCEarly) whereas the impact of the dummy VCBridge (short duration investment) seems 
to be magnified by the bubble period (with perhaps a greater grandstanding effect) although 
the evidence is not conclusive. We assume that even if the inclusion of bubble period can lead 
to underestimates of the positive impact of receiving VC financing in early stage (for very 
long duration), it does not challenge our main findings. 
 
[Insert table 5] 
 
(ii) Robustness of results 
 
As a robustness check, we re-estimate our results using the Cox PH model. Table 6 reports the 
results of the Cox PH model and shows that our results are qualitatively unchanged (with the 
exception of a slight reduction in the statistical significance of the coefficients of some 
variables). Table 6 column (1) provides estimation results of the pooled model; columns (2) 
and (3) present the results for the competing risks model which distinguishes between exits 
due to firm merger/acquisition and delistings due to business failure. 
As already explained, this type of model requires only that competing risks are mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive (i.e., a firm cannot exit simultaneously through liquidation and 
acquisition/merger)16 (Estève-Perez et al., 2010). Narendranathan and Stewart (1991) provide 
a test for whether exit routes are independent, i.e. whether  exit to a different state is 
behaviorally distinct (rather than simply incidental) in continuous time proportional hazards 
                                                          
16
 See Appendix B.  
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(PH) models (Jenkins, 2005). Therefore, we conducted proportionality of risks tests proposed 
by Narendranathan and Stewart (1991) and explained in Appendix B. We reject (at the 1% 
statistical significance level) the null hypothesis that different forms of exit are behaviorally 
equal (TS = 154). We also investigated alternative distributions as the baseline survival 
function for the AFT model which suggests that our findings (not reported here) are mostly 
robust. 
The Cox PH specification corresponding to the model for normal (1998-2000) and hot (1996-
1997 and 2001-2006) markets, and single exit, are available on request; the results are similar 
to the results of the AFT model (Table 5).  
 
[Insert table 6] 
  
Finally, we examine alternative measure for the variables VCExpansion and VCBridge. As 
already explained, if we follow the classification in Wang et al. (2003) and categorize firms 
with less than two years of VC support before the IPO as short VC-backed IPOs and 
reclassify the bridge stage, then our main results remain unchanged but are slightly modified 
for the impact of VCExpansion and VCBridge. Thus, our main conclusions are confirmed. 
Table 7 reports the results for this alternative specification (AFT specification). 
 
[Insert table 7] 
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examined the survival of a unique sample of 125 VC-backed and 87 non-VC-
backed French IPOs over the 1996-2006 period. We estimate an Accelerated Failure Time 
(AFT) model and present the results of a survival analysis based on pooled data, and the 
results of competing risk specifications, comparing the survival times of VC and non-VC-
backed firms. When controlling for a broad range of other known determinants of survival 
times, we find that VC firms cannot be treated as a homogeneous group of investors to 
analyze their impact on firm survival. Indeed, closer analysis reveals that the capacity for VC 
to add value to portfolio companies and to improve their survival time depends, among other 
elements, on VC investment duration.  
Our findings show that VC firms do not create additional value if the investment is in later 
stages or equivalently if investment duration is too short (less than a minimum of 2 years) 
while longer investment duration allows venture capitalists to monitor firms efficiently and to 
add some value. However, for the whole sample period, the investment in the earliest stages 
(or equivalently longest VC duration investment) seems to be more prone to adverse 
selection. One interesting result emerges if we split the sample into two sub-periods of 
analysis: normal and bubble activity. Our findings show that during normal periods of 
activity, the longer the duration of VC involvement/monitoring the greater will be the positive 
effect on firm survival time. This positive impact disappears completely for the bubble period. 
The positive aspects linked to longer duration of VC investment seem to outweigh the 
negative effects of adverse selection only during normal periods of activity. 
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Our findings have implications for the French VC industry. Our results do not indicate that 
VC companies generally make a positive contribution to the survival of their investee 
companies. However, VC firms are able to add value to portfolio companies if the investment 
is for a longer time period, and is in the early and expansion stages of firm development. 
Thus, in France we need to encourage this type of VC investment rather than later stage 
investments in which the French VC industry is specialized at the moment.   
Our findings also have implications for entrepreneurs. When analyzing the advantages and 
disadvantages linked to the presence of VC firms in the capital of their company, 
entrepreneurs should consider that certain types of venture capitalists may be more or less 
involved in the value adding process. 
This study has some limitations. First, the bubble period 1998-2000 is included in our period 
of analysis and may lead to some overestimation of the poor survival of VC-backed IPOs. 
However, in our view, our main results are not skewed by the inclusion of this bubble period. 
Second, our analysis includes only French IPOs and it would be interesting to compare these 
results for France with findings for Germany and the UK.    
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Appendix A 
 
Table 8: Duration of VC investment for VC-backed IPOs 
 
Duration of VC investment (years) 
  
Variables N Mean Median p-value p-value 
    
t-test Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test 
VCEarly 47 4.97 4.00 0.0000 0.0000 
VCExpansion 41 3.95 3.00 0.2490 0.0040 
VCBridge 35 1.00 1.00 0.0000 0.0000 
VCEarly versus VCExpansion    0.1218 0.1381 
VCExpansion versus VCBridge    0.0000 0.0000 
VCEarly versus VCBridge    0.0000 0.0000 
First, we conduct a standard two-sided t test to test for differences in means between two subgroups type: for example 
VCEarly and the rest. In addition, we use the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test to analyze the equality of medians. Second, we 
conduct a standard two-sided t (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney) test to test for differences in means(medians) between subgroups: 
for example VCEarly versus VCExpansion with VCBridge excluded. Variables are defined in Section 2. Note that for 2 VC 
firms, we do not have the exact date of VC investment. The duration of VC investment is defined as the difference (in years) 
between the date of first VC investment and the date of IPO. 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
Narendranathan and Stewart (1991) provide a test for whether exit routes are independent, i.e. 
whether exit to different states is behaviorally distinct (rather than incidental) for continuous 
time proportional hazard (PH) models (Jenkins, 2005). 
This tests the hypothesis that cause-specific hazards are all proportional (i.e. that all 
parameters except the intercepts are equal across hazards) (Narendranathan and Stewart, 
1991). The test statistic TS proposed by Narendranathan and Stewart (1991) is given by: 
        ሺ   ሻ    ሺ   ሻ  ∑     (  )   
 
where ln(LCR ) is the maximized log-likelihood from the competing risks model (the sum of 
those from the component risk model i.e. merger/acquisition and liquidation), ln(LSR) is the 
maximized log-likelihood from the single-risk model, nj is the number of exits to state j and       ∑    ⁄  where there are j = 1, . . . , J destination states (i.e. two destination states here). 
The test-statistic is distributed Chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
restrictions (Jenkins, 2005). 
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Appendix C 
Table 9: Competing and single risk estimates (AFT model) with VC as a single dummy 
variable 
  (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) 
 
All Exit All Exit M&A M&A Liquidation Liquidation 
VARIABLES Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR 
              
Age 0.033a 1.034 -0.027 0.974 0.086*** 1.090 
 
[0.021] 
 
[0.042] 
 
[0.032] 
 Age2 -0.001** 0.999 0.001 1.001 -0.002*** 0.998 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.001] 
 
[0.001] 
 Ln(size) 0.065 1.067 0.021 1.021 0.050 1.051 
 
[0.069] 
 
[0.083] 
 
[0.089] 
 Growth Rate 0.421** 1.523 0.589** 1.802 0.171 1.187 
 
[0.204] 
 
[0.251] 
 
[0.270] 
 Investment Bank Reputation 0.214 1.238 0.156 1.169 0.212 1.236 
 
[0.154] 
 
[0.217] 
 
[0.183] 
 Insider Ownership(%) -0.007** 0.993 -0.002 0.998 -0.012*** 0.988 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
 Venture Capital -0.279b 0.757 -0.047 0.954 -0.668*** 0.513 
 
[0.181] 
 
[0.240] 
 
[0.232] 
 Intangibles Ratio -0.712 0.491 -1.704*** 0.182 1.550* 4.711 
 
[0.471] 
 
[0.510] 
 
[0.817] 
 Ln(patent) 0.302** 1.352 0.629*** 1.876 0.053 1.055 
 
[0.128] 
 
[0.230] 
 
[0.146] 
 Year 1998 -0.421** 0.656 -0.225 0.798 -0.617** 0.539 
 
[0.207] 
 
[0.272] 
 
[0.254] 
 Year 1999 -0.173 0.841 -0.134 0.874 0.000 1.000 
 
[0.234] 
 
[0.298] 
 
[0.282] 
 Year 2000 -0.459* 0.632 -0.559* 0.572 -0.132 0.877 
 
[0.245] 
 
[0.328] 
 
[0.318] 
 Constant 4.298*** 
 
4.622*** 
 
9.840*** 
 
 
[1.279] 
 
[1.413] 
 
[1.597] 
 
       Observations 212 212 212 212 212 212 
Nb Exits 80 80 47 47 33 33 
Log Likelihood -165.507 -165.507 -116.667 -116.667 -80.507 -80.507 
Wald Chi square 49.24***   38.06***   195.03***   
Notes : ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
All duration models include a full vector of sector dummy variables, not reported here for clarity. Variables 
are defined in Section 2. 
(a) : p= 0.113 and (b) : p= 0.123 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on variables used in the regression 
Variables Total sample (N=212) VC (N=125) NVC (N=87) T-Diff mean (median) 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
  
  (sd)               
Age (Years) 10.29 9.00 10.16 8.00 10.48 9.00 _ 
 
(7.57) 
 
(7.73) 
 
(7.37) 
   Size (M Euros) 68.31 34.23 87.03 44.56 41.42 18.94 # (#) 
 
(91.80) 
 
(107.53) 
 
(52.57) 
   Growth Rate 0.25 0.19 0.26 0.22 0.25 0.18 _ 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.36) 
   Investment Bank Reputation 0.55 1.00 0.45 0.00 0.67 1.00 *** 
 
(0.50) 
 
(0.50) 
 
(0.47) 
   Insider Ownership (%) 74.86 75.97 66.65 66.28 86.65 92.75 # (#) 
 
(23.87) 
 
(19.92) 
 
(24.25) 
   Intangibles Ratio 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.09 _ 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.17) 
 
(0.14) 
   Patent 1.67 0.00 2.38 0.00 0.65 0.00 ***(***) 
 
(4.75) 
 
(5.72) 
 
(2.55) 
   Year dummies 
        1998 0.15 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.14 0.00 _ 
 
(0.36) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.35) 
   1999 0.12 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.08 0.00 _ 
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.36) 
 
(0.27) 
   2000 0.23 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.24 0.00 _ 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.43) 
   Industry dummies 
        ITS 0.38 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.39 0.00 _ 
 
(0.48) 
 
(0.48) 
 
(0.49) 
   NHT 0.17 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.18 0.00 _ 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.37) 
 
(0.39) 
   Media 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.00 _ 
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.33) 
   Telecom 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.00 _ 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.23) 
   Life Sciences 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.00 _ 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.21) 
   Other 0.18 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.19 0.00 _ 
  (0.39)   (0.38)   (0.40)       
Notes : #, ***, **, * significant at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively.  
The sample includes 125 VC-backed IPOs and 87 non-VC-backed IPOs during the period 1996-2006. Age is calculated as 
the difference (in years) between company’s founding and IPO dates. Size is the market capitalization of the IPO firm at the 
IPO price (expressed as millions euros). Growth Rate is the difference in firm employee numbers at the time of IPO and 1 
year after (difference measured in natural logarithm). Investment Bank Reputation is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the 
IPO is backed by reputable lead investment bank and 0 otherwise. Insider Ownership is the percentage of shares held by 
board members at the time of IPO. Patent is the number of patent owned by the company at the time of IPO. Intangibles 
Ratio is the capitalized amount of intangible assets divided by total assets.  
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Table 2 : Descriptive statistics for listed and delisted IPOs 
Variables IPO still trading (N=132) IPO Delisted (N=80) T-Diff mean (median) 
 
Mean Median Mean Median     
 
(sd)   (sd)        
Age (Years) 10.85 9.00 9.37 8.00 _(**) 
 
(7.18) 
 
(8.13) 
   Size (M Euros) 72.80 39.30 61.00 22.00 _(**) 
 
(89.40) 
 
(95.70) 
   Growth Rate 0.29 0.24 0.20 0.15 _(*) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.35) 
   Venture Capital 0.60 1.00 0.57 1.00 _ 
 (0.49)  (0.50)   
VC Number 1.77 1.00 2.00 1.00 _ 
 (2.29)  (2.39)   
VCEarly 0.23 0.00 0.20 0.00 _ 
 (0.43)  (0.40)   
VCExpansion 0.23 0.00 0.15 0.00 _ 
 (0.42)  (0.36)   
VCBridge 0.14 0.00 0.21 0.00 _ 
 (0.34)  (0.41)   
Investment Bank Reputation 0.54 1.00 0.56 1.00 _ 
 
(0.50) 
 
(0.50) 
   Insider Ownership (%) 72.94 73.55 78.03 79.97 _(*) 
 
(23.42) 
 
(24.42) 
   Intangibles Ratio 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.08 _ 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.18) 
   Patent 1.98 0.00 1.17 0.00 _(*) 
 
(4.70) 
 
(4.83) 
   Year dummies 
      1998 0.09 0.00 0.25 0.00 *** 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.43) 
   1999 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.00 _ 
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.33) 
   2000 0.22 0.00 0.25 0.00 _ 
 
(0.41) 
 
(0.44) 
   Industry dummies 
      ITS 0.37 0.00 0.39 0.00 _ 
 
(0.48) 
 
(0.49) 
   NHT 0.17 0.00 0.16 0.00 _ 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.37) 
   Media 0.14 0.00 0.10 0.00 _ 
 
(0.34) 
 
(0.30) 
   Telecom 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.00 _ 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.30) 
   Life Sciences 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.00 _ 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.22) 
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Other 0.17 0.00 0.20 0.00 _ 
  (0.38)   (0.40)       
Notes : ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
For our sample of 212 firms listed during the period 1996-2006, the table shows means, medians and standard deviations of 
the variables separately for firms that survived to December 2012 and firms that had been delisted by December 2012. The 
variables are defined in Section 3. 
 
Table 3: Mean (median) time (in years) until delisting. The table is based only on the 80 IPOs 
which were delisted from the market within the sample period. 
 M&A  Liquidation  Total Delisting  
Variables 
Duration 
mean (median) 
Obs  Duration  
mean(median) 
Obs  Duration  
mean(median) 
Obs  
VC-backed 5.833(5.000) 24  6.727(6.000) 22  6.260(6.000) 46  
VCEarly  6.200(5.500) 10  6.833(6.000) 6  6.437(6.000) 16  
VCExpansion 6.400(5.000) 5  7.571(7.000) 7  7.083(7.000) 12  
VCBridge 5.375(5.500) 9  6.000(5.000) 9  5.705(5.000) 18  
Non-VC-backed 7.913(9.000) 23  5.636(5.000) 11  7.176(7.500) 34  
                The variables are defined in Section 3. 
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Table 4: Competing and single risk estimates (AFT model) 
  (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) 
 
All Exit All Exit M&A M&A Liquidation Liquidation 
VARIABLES Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR 
              
Age 0.019 1.019 -0.048 0.953 0.097*** 1.101 
 
[0.023] 
 
[0.050] 
 
[0.036] 
 Age2 -0.001* 0.999 0.001 1.001 -0.002*** 0.998 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.002] 
 
[0.001] 
 Ln(size) 0.051 1.052 0.004 1.004 0.023 1.023 
 
[0.069] 
 
[0.083] 
 
[0.091] 
 Growth Rate 0.412** 1.509 0.483** 1.621 0.212 1.236 
 
[0.197] 
 
[0.236] 
 
[0.261] 
 Investment Bank Reputation 0.190 1.209 0.158 1.171 0.182 1.200 
 
[0.152] 
 
[0.211] 
 
[0.178]  
Insider Ownership -0.007** 0.993 -0.002 0.998 -0.012*** 0.988 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
 VC Number -0.088** 0.916 -0.114** 0.892 -0.035 0.965 
 
[0.042] 
 
[0.053] 
 
[0.050] 
 VCEarly 0.052 1.054 0.214 1.239 -0.305 0.737 
 
[0.279] 
 
[0.367] 
 
[0.352] 
 VCExpansion 0.261 1.298 0.894** 2.446 -0.697* 0.498 
 
[0.271] 
 
[0.360] 
 
[0.363] 
 VCBridge -0.224 0.799 0.050 1.051 -0.665** 0.514 
 
[0.246] 
 
[0.333] 
 
[0.302] 
 Intangibles Ratio -0.715 0.489 -1.834*** 0.160 1.586* 4.885 
 
[0.478] 
 
[0.504] 
 
[0.820] 
 Ln(patent) 0.282** 1.326 0.634*** 1.885 0.049 1.050 
 
[0.124] 
 
[0.221] 
 
[0.145] 
 Year 1998 -0.416** 0.660 -0.176 0.839 -0.607** 0.545 
 
[0.205] 
 
[0.270] 
 
[0.255] 
 Year 1999 -0.149 0.861 -0.130 0.878 0.024 1.024 
 
[0.231] 
 
[0.286] 
 
[0.307] 
 Year 2000 -0.382 0.682 -0.481 0.618 -0.035 0.965 
 
[0.243] 
 
[0.320] 
 
[0.333] 
 Constant 4.690*** 
 
5.162*** 
 
9.874***  
 
[1.276] 
 
[1.472] 
 
[1.557]  
       Observations 212 212 212 212 212 212 
Nb Exits 80 80 47 47 33 33 
Log Likelihood -163.334 -163.334 -113.078 -113.078 -79.543 -79.543 
Wald Chi square 58.37***   51.97***   219.99***   
Notes : ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. All duration models 
include a full vector of sector dummy variables, not reported here for brevity. The variables are defined in Section 3. The 
Time Ratio (TR) is calculated as the exponential of the estimated coefficient, exp(β). A time ratio greater than 1 indicates that 
an increase in the covariate increases survival time (or equivalently, slows down failure). For instance, the time ratio of 
Growth Rate ranges from 1.509 to 1.523 indicating that survival time increases by a multiple of 1.509 to 1.523 as Growth 
Rate increases by one unit, or equivalently that a one-unit increase in Growth Rate increases survival time by between 51% 
and 52%. 
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Table 5: AFT model for normal (1996-1997 and 2001-2006) and hot markets (1998-2000). 
Exits are treated as a homogeneous event. 
All Exits (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) 
Bubble period Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
VARIABLES Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR 
 
  
 
            
Age 0.070 1.073 0.053 1.054 0.003 1.003 0.003 1.003 
 
[0.052] 
 
[0.054] 
 
[0.022] 
 
[0.023] 
 Age2 -0.002 0.998 -0.002 0.998 -0.000 1.000 -0.000 1.000 
 
[0.002] 
 
[0.002] 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.000] 
 Ln(size) 0.111* 1.117 0.119* 1.126 0.029 1.029 0.012 1.012 
 
[0.067] 
 
[0.067] 
 
[0.073] 
 
[0.073] 
 Growth Rate 0.443* 1.557 0.432* 1.540 0.673* 1.960 0.589a 1.802 
 
[0.240] 
 
[0.238] 
 
[0.409] 
 
[0.368] 
 Invest. Bank 
 Reputation -0.068 0.934 -0.061 0.941 0.564*** 1.758 0.583*** 1.792 
 
[0.209] 
 
[0.213] 
 
[0.193] 
 
[0.196] 
 Insider  
Ownership(%) -0.006 0.994 -0.006 0.994 -0.006* 0.994 -0.006* 0.994 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.003] 
 Venture 
 Capital -0.734*** 0.480 
  
0.231 1.260 
  
 
[0.270] 
   
[0.243] 
   VC Number 
  
-0.118* 0.889 
  
-0.141* 0.868 
   
[0.062] 
   
[0.076] 
 VCEarly 
  
-0.304 0.738 
  
0.982** 2.669 
   
[0.388] 
   
[0.487] 
 VCExpansion 
  
0.161 1.175 
  
0.422 1.524 
   
[0.441] 
   
[0.326] 
 VCBridge 
  
-0.467 0.627 
  
0.430 1.537 
   
[0.344] 
   
[0.308] 
 Intangibles 
 Ratio 0.779 2.179 0.727 2.070 -1.373*** 0.253 -1.280*** 0.278 
 
[0.773] 
 
[0.760] 
 
[0.436] 
 
[0.417] 
 Ln(patent) 0.122 1.130 0.066 1.068 0.753*** 2.124 1.025*** 2.787 
 
[0.163] 
 
[0.147] 
 
[0.219] 
 
[0.263] 
 Constant 3.576*** 
 
3.507** 
 
3.395*** 
 
3.446*** 
 
 
[1.333] 
 
[1.394] 
 
[1.243] 
 
[1.207] 
 
         Observations 107 107 107 107 105 105 105 105 
Nb Exits 50 50 50 50 30 30 30 30 
Log Likelihood -98.424 -98.424 -97.246 -97.246 -51.030 -51.030 -48.421 -48.421 
Wald Chi square 24.68** 
 
25.88*   113.70***   120.13***   
Notes : ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. All duration models 
include a full vector of sector dummy variables, not reported here for clarity. The sample is divided into two sub-samples: the 
hot market period (1998-2000) with the bubble period=Yes (Models 1 and 2) and the normal period (1996-1997/2001-2006) 
with bubble period= No (Models 3 and 4). All the models show the results for exits treated as a homogeneous event. The 
variables are defined in Section 3.  
Model 2: p-value=0.07. Model 4: (a): p= 0.109. 
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Table 6: Competing and single risk estimates (Cox PH model) 
  (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) 
 
All Exit All Exit M&A M&A Liquidation Liquidation 
 
Coeff HR Coeff HR Coeff HR 
VARIABLES       
              
Age -0.056 0.945 0.023 1.023 -0.162** 0.850 
 
[0.039] 
 
[0.053] 
 
[0.068] 
 Age2 0.002*** 1.002 -0.000 1.000 0.004*** 1.004 
 
[0.001] 
 
[0.001] 
 
[0.001] 
 Ln(size) -0.122 0.885 -0.085 0.919 -0.071 0.931 
 
[0.114] 
 
[0.139] 
 
[0.183] 
 Growth Rate -0.594* 0.552 -0.643* 0.526 -0.664 0.515 
 
[0.343] 
 
[0.367] 
 
[0.714] 
 Investment Bank 
Reputation -0.174 0.840 -0.080 0.923 -0.208 0.812 
 
[0.252] 
 
[0.351] 
 
[0.370] 
 Insider Ownership(%) 0.011** 1.011 0.006 1.006 0.018** 1.018 
 
[0.005] 
 
[0.007] 
 
[0.007] 
 VC Number 0.157** 1.170 0.231** 1.259 0.096 1.100 
 
[0.071] 
 
[0.096] 
 
[0.109] 
 VCEarly -0.263 0.769 -0.712 0.491 0.319 1.376 
 
[0.505] 
 
[0.650] 
 
[0.808] 
 VCExpansion -0.508 0.601 -1.603** 0.201 0.762 2.142 
 
[0.505] 
 
[0.725] 
 
[0.746] 
 VCBridge 0.049 1.050 -0.412 0.662 0.800b 2.226 
 
[0.381] 
 
[0.509] 
 
[0.586] 
 Intangibles Ratio 1.052 2.862 3.175*** 23.929 -3.540* 0.029 
 
[0.941] 
 
[0.902] 
 
[1.875] 
 Ln(patent) -0.351a 0.704 -0.923* 0.397 0.121 1.129 
 
[0.236] 
 
[0.472] 
 
[0.280] 
 Year 1998 0.612* 1.844 0.227 1.255 0.977** 2.656 
 
[0.324] 
 
[0.432] 
 
[0.498] 
 Year 1999 0.499 1.647 0.705 2.024 0.096 1.101 
 
[0.398] 
 
[0.498] 
 
[0.613] 
 Year 2000 0.412 1.510 0.568 1.764 -0.145 0.865 
 
[0.417] 
 
[0.524] 
 
[0.776] 
 
       Observations 212 212 212 212 212 212 
Nb Exits 80 80 47 47 33 33 
Log Likelihood -383.882 -383.882 -214.848 -214.848 -146.011 -146.011 
Wald Chi square 85.41***   51.90***   15374.72***   
Notes : ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. All duration models 
include a full vector of sector dummy variables, not reported here for brevity. Variables are defined in Section 2. 
(a): p-value= 0.136 
(b): p-value= 0.172 
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Table 7 : Competing and single risk estimates (AFT model) with alternative measures for the 
variables VCExpansion and VCBridge 
  (1) (3) (5) (7) (9) (11) 
 
Coeff TR Coeff TR Coeff TR 
VARIABLES 
      
              
Age 0.020 1.020 -0.055 0.946 0.101*** 1.106 
 
[0.023] 
 
[0.053] 
 
[0.036] 
 Age2 
-0.001* 0.999 0.001 1.001 -0.002*** 0.998 
 
[0.000] 
 
[0.002] 
 
[0.001] 
 Ln(size) 0.056 1.057 0.007 1.007 0.030 1.030 
 
[0.070] 
 
[0.083] 
 
[0.094] 
 Growth Rate 0.426** 1.532 0.492** 1.636 0.214 1.239 
 
[0.192] 
 
[0.232] 
 
[0.260] 
 Investment Bank Reputation 0.201 1.223 0.147 1.158 0.238 1.269 
 
[0.150] 
 
[0.207] 
 
[0.177] 
 Insider Ownership(%) 
-0.008** 0.993 -0.003 0.997 -0.012*** 0.988 
 
[0.003] 
 
[0.004] 
 
[0.004] 
 VC Number 
-0.086** 0.918 -0.107** 0.899 -0.053 0.948 
 
[0.040] 
 
[0.053] 
 
[0.049] 
 VCEarly 0.011 1.011 0.140 1.150 -0.227 0.797 
 
[0.261] 
 
[0.352] 
 
[0.338] 
 VCExpansion 0.339 1.404 0.837** 2.310 -0.356 0.700 
 
[0.248] 
 
[0.341] 
 
[0.358] 
 VCBridge 
-0.324* 0.723 -0.092 0.912 -0.600*** 0.549 
 
[0.193] 
 
[0.283] 
 
[0.227] 
 Intangibles Ratio 
-0.737 0.479 -1.798*** 0.166 1.393* 4.029* 
 
[0.471] 
 
[0.496] 
 
[0.794] 
 Ln(patent) 0.283** 1.327 0.629*** 1.876 0.024 1.024 
 
[0.120] 
 
[0.219] 
 
[0.152] 
 Year 1998 
-0.403* 0.668 -0.146 0.864 -0.599** 0.549 
 
[0.206] 
 
[0.267] 
 
[0.262] 
 Year 1999 
-0.125 0.883 -0.113 0.893 0.051 1.052 
 
[0.229] 
 
[0.288] 
 
[0.301] 
 Year 2000 
-0.378 0.685 -0.477 0.620 -0.024 0.976 
 
[0.239] 
 
[0.317] 
 
[0.324] 
 Constant 4.603*** 
 
5.191*** 
 
9.677*** 
 
 
[1.269] 
 
[1.469] 
 
[1.616] 
 
 
      Observations 212 212 212 212 212 212 
Nb Exits 80 80 47 47 33 33 
Log Likelihood 
-162.323 -162.323 -113.033 -113.033 -78.763 -78.763 
Wald Chi square 56.83***   48.27***   214.90   
Notes : ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors in brackets. All duration models 
include a full vector of sector dummy variables, not reported here for brevity. Variables are defined in Section 2. 
 
 
